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ESSAY
The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd
and the Modern Supreme Court's Attempt
to Control Constitutional Confrontations
NEAL DEVINS* AND MICHAEL A. FnTS**

"Observe due measure, for right timing is in all things the most important factor." 1
INTRODUCTION

Can Congress, through positive law, absolve itself of its responsibility to
interpret the Constitution? That question was squarely presented in Raines v.
Byrd, 2 a case in which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
congressional efforts to compel it to adjudicate the constitutionality of the 1996
Item Veto Ace before the President ever had an opportunity to exercise his
"item veto" power. More precisely, by authorizing lawmaker challenges to the
Act's constitutionality and specifying that the Court was "duty [bound]" to
"expedit[iously]" resolve such disputes, 4 Congress effectively asked the Court
to perform a lawmaking function-to determine whether proposed legislation
was constitutional. Indeed, even if we assume that Congress reached a tentative
but uncertain conclusion about the Act's constitutionality, Congress was at least
petitioning the Court to serve as a modern-day "Council of Revision"reviewing the constitutionality of legislation that had yet to affect anyone's
rights and that would not affect anyone's rights until the Court rendered its
decision. The Court turned back this legislative delegation, but only by indirection, ruling that members of Congress lacked standing to bring the suit. Noting
both that the Item Veto Act has no bearing on the process of enacting an
appropriation and that Congress can statutorily nullify presidential item veto
authority, 5 Raines concluded that lawmaker claims that the Act affected the
meaning and effectiveness of their votes on appropriations bills were "wholly
abstract and widely dispersed. " 6 As a result, unless and until the President item
vetoed an appropriation, claims that this power affected either private interests
or the lawmaking process were no more than guesswork.

*
**

Ernest W. Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary.
Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania 1banks to Mark Epley and Eric
Santoro for research assistance and to Jack Levy at The Georgetown Law Journal for his encouragement.
1. HEsiOD c. 700 B.C.
2. 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
3. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 691-692 (West Supp. 1997). The Act grants the President the power to cancel
(subject to congressional override) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of
new direct spending, and certain limited tax benefits.
4. /d. at§ 692(c); see also id. at§ 692(a)(l).
5. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2320.
6. /d. at 2322.
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In adopting this analysis, the Court did not formally invalidate the Act's
congressional standing/expedited review provisions. Indeed, the Court seemed
to overlook the fact that the Item Veto Act (crafted by Congress and embraced
by the White House without condition) specifically provided for this type of
lawsuit. Portraying the case as an attempt by renegade members of Congress to
bring down a law they disliked but could not defeat, 7 the Court claimed that it
must steer clear of this dispute or risk disrupting "the peaceful coexistence"
between countermajoritarian judicial review and democratic government. 8
In light of this history, we believe Raines offers a unique opportunity to
explore the process by which the modem Supreme Court seeks to control the
timing of its confrontations with Congress and the executive branch. Since
Alexander Bickel first wrote his classic work The Least Dangerous Branch, 9
judges and commentators have recognized the benefits of the "passive virtues," 10 that is, the procedural and jurisdictional delays that provide a "time lag
between legislation and adjudication, as well as shifting the line of vision." 11
This temporal distance, Bickel argued, "cushions the clash between the Court
and any given legislative majority and strengthens the Court's hand in gaining
acceptance for its principles." 12
At first glance, Raines appears to serve as a classic exercise of the passive
virtues. Newspaper coverage, for example, observed that a Supreme Court
decision on the constitutionality of the Item Veto Act would be imminent and
inevitable, and Raines was, therefore, just delaying a substantive decision on the
Act. 13 Furthermore, the lack of any real disagreement on the outcome-the vote
was seven-to-two for dismissal-seemed to suggest that the Justices did not see
this result as raising any major ideological issues.
We maintain, however, that the decision and its political history are more
complex than the classic Bickelian analysis suggests, revealing a Court that
delayed consideration of some issues, accelerated decisions on others, and
7. See id. at 2315, 2322.
8. Id. at 2322. By describing a spate of "analogous confrontations between one or both Houses of
Congress and the Executive Branch," the Court made clear that judicial recognition of "claimed injury
to official authority or power" would " improperly and unnecessarily" plunge the Court into bitter
interbranch struggles. The fact that the White House as well as most members of Congress endorsed the
item veto as an essential deficit reduction tool did not matter. See id. at 2320-21. Political expediency
also played a large part in the enactment of item veto legislation. See Neal Devins, In Search of the Lost
Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997); Michael A.
Fitts, The Foibles of Formalism: Applying a Political "Transaction Cost" Approach to Separation of
Powers, 47 CASE. W. REs. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
·
9. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
10. Alexander M . Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.REv. 40,40 (1961).
11. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 116; see, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 284 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Larry Sager, Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978).
12. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 116.
13. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, President Keeps Line-Item Veto; Ruling Leaves Door Open to Future
Constitutional Challenge, WASH. PosT, June 27, 1997, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks of
Justice, N.Y. TiMEs, July 1, 1997, at AI.
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simply ignored still others. While the center of this complicated dance was the
expedited review provision, which stood as a symbol of modem democratic
opposition to the exercise of the passive virtues, there were in fact two separate
and interrelated timing decisions made by each branch of government.
On one side was Congress's original determination to accelerate both its own
vote on the Item Veto Act and the subsequent judicial review of that legislation.
As a variety of lawmakers and commentators observed, Congress chose to pass
the Act at a moment (April 1996) when it was unclear exactly which party
would first enjoy the new power-that is, a Democratic or Republican president. 14 While there are real benefits to making a decision behind a political
"veil of ignorance," 15 there can also be costs-such as a lack of political debate
and a less clear understanding of who are the winners and losers. In this case, the
problem was exacerbated by Congress's second timing decision--to accelerate judicial review through inclusion of the expedited review provision-in effect, requiring
judicial resolution before either the Court or members of Congress had the time or
opportunity to adequately consider the Act's impact and constitutionality.
On the other side was the Court, which was faced with two complementary
timing decisions: whether to review the provision requiring expedited review
and whether to decide the substantive constitutionality of the item veto. In the
first instance, the Court, faced with democratic opposition to its exercise of the
passive virtues, avoided a direct confrontation with Congress over this fundamental issue by, paradoxically, accelerating a totally separate confrontation-in this
instance, with the D.C. Circuit. By deciding the theoretical question of congressional standing, the Court was able to overrule a long line of D.C. Circuit cases
recognizing the doctrine. At the same time, this approach allowed the Court to
delay an immediate confrontation with the elected branches over the substance
of the Item Veto Act as we, and the Bickelian analysis, would recommend.

14. In delaying passage until close to the end of the Clinton presidency and making the veto
effective only after election of the next president, Congress achieved agreement based on its inability to
determine who the institutional beneficiaries of the Act would be. See, e.g., 142 CoNG. REc. H2980
(daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hoyer suggesting that the January I enactment date was
chosen because Congress did not want to give the line-item veto to a Democratic president); 142 CONG.
REc. H3027 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Clinger confessing that sponsors of the
Line-Item Veto Act chose a January I enactment date because both parties expected their own nominee
to win the 1996 presidential election); 142 CONG. REc. S2987 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg accusing Republicans of delaying the Line-Item Veto Act to avoid giving the new
power to their political rival, President Clinton); 142 CONG. REc. S2991 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Exon claiming that the January I enactment date is evidence of the partisanship
behind the Line-Item Veto Act). The media has also championed the idea that Republican lawmakers
delayed the enactment of the Line-Item Veto Act because they hoped that a Republican president would
be elected in 1996. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, With Ceremony, Clinton Signs Line-Item Veto Measure,
N.Y. nMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at B7; Greg Pierce, Rue the Day, WASH. liMES, Nov. 19, 1996, atA5; Power
to the President? WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 1997, at A16; The Line Item Veto Decision, WASH. PosT, Apr. 14,
1997, at Al6.
15. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss: Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in
Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917, 966-81 (1990) (discussing benefits of behind-the-veil
decisionrnaking in separation of powers context).
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In our view, however, the Court's characterization of congressional standing
as an invitation to interbranch armageddon is, at the very least, unnecessary.
After all, the Court could have concluded that Congress is without power to
authorize its members to serve as self-appointed "counsel adversary" and
challenge a law that has yet to take effect. Both the Framers' rejection of direct
judicial participation in the lawmaking process as well as the bedrock Article III
prohibition against advisory opinions countenance against the Court's review of
a law of indeterminate scope and sweep. Had Raines rested on these grounds, as
we will argue in Part I of this essay, the decision would have focused attention
on Congress's obligation to independently interpret the Constitution.
Part II explores why the Court may have thought it so important to reach out
and decide the congressional standing issue. The Court, we speculate, finds little
institutional gain in immersing itself in the resolution of highly charged intramural squabbles brought by disgruntled members of Congress. 16 Unlike the D.C.
Circuit, whose approval of congressional standing enhances its power inside the
Washington beltway, the Supreme Court may be more interested in "maintain[ing] public esteem" by avoiding head-on conflicts with Congress and the White
House. 17 Raines, moreover, proved a good vehicle to dampen (if not bring down
altogether) congressional standing. The Court and Congress both saw Raines as
low-stakes litigation. In particular, once the President item vetoed a congressionally approved program, a justiciable private suit would almost certainly materialize.18
Finally, Part ill discusses why, quite apart from our legal arguments on how
the Court should have approached the advisory opinion and congressional
standing issues, it was important as a prudential matter for the Court to delay
the ultimate decision on the Item Veto Act. Recognizing that Congress and the
Executive constantly intersect with each other, the Court, we suggest, should
prefer to let the branches bargain over the operation of the item veto and other
structural changes before reaching a decision about their constitutionality. This
bargaining informs judicial intervention by what it reveals factually about the
accommodations each branch makes to the structural innovation. It also offers
normative feedback on the evolving views of the branches on the constitutional
16. Most of these disputes either implicate the internal workings of Congress or are a byproduct of
Congress's unwillingness to assert its institutional interests against the executive on foreign policy
matters. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (coalition of 27 Congressmen
challenging House rule requiring that tax increases be approved by at least three-fifths of members
voting); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1150 (D. D.C. 1990) (coalition of 55 Congressmen
challenging anticipated use of force in Persian Gulf without congressional approval).
17. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2322; see also John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive
in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoss. 293, 306-307 (1993) (describing congressional and judicial avoidance of
exercising rights of governance in the foreign affairs and war powers areas).
18. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2325 (Souter, J., concurring). On October 16, 1997, the City of New York
filed suit challenging President Clinton's use of the line-item veto on Medicaid funds appropriated for
New York. See N.Y. Files Suit Against Line-Item Veto, Cm. TR.rn., Oct. 17, 1997, at Al.
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value of the change in light of that experience. Structural arrangements that do
not disrupt the balance of power, we presume, will tend to be accorded a greater
presumption of constitutionality. 19
Despite our difficulty with the reasoning and doctrinal approach adopted by
the Court, in the Conclusion we outline our ultimate agreement with the result
in Raines. It is not surprising that only two Justices, Stephen Breyer and John
Paul Stevens, formally dissented from the Court's judgment to return the item
veto dispute to elected govemment. 20 With that said, Raines is unlikely to be the
last word on congressional standing. Notwithstanding its muscular rhetoric, the
Court reserved for another day the question of whether congressional standing
might be authorized in an otherwise nonjusticiable dispute?' By failing to
establish its own rule, Raines exemplifies the Rehnquist Court's increasing
tendency to choose standards that allow for discretionary application instead of
absolutist rules? 2
In the end, the approach outlined in this essay resembles the classic Bickelian
strategy of judicial repose-except updated and modified for the modem separation of powers context. In our view, not only was delay more appropriate in
Raines than in many of the cases Bickel discussed, but the challenges to delay
by Congress more direct. By passing the expedited review provision, Congress
expressed its opposition to exercising the passive virtues. Given the value of
delay in separation of powers confrontations, the Court should have met this
challenge more directly by dismissing the lawsuit on advisory opinion grounds.
l. CONGRESS'S DUTY TO INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION
A. THE ITEM VETO ACT AND THE ARTICLE ill PROHIBffiON
AGAINST ADVISORY OPINIONS

Imagine that Congress, uncertain about the constitutionality of a proposal to
statutorily outlaw flag burning, asks the Supreme Court for an opinion about its
constitutionality. The Court, of course, would decline such an invitation to
render an advisory opinion. Perhaps, as it did when Secretary of State Thomas

19. Without any sense of whether or when the President might use the item veto, Raines, 117 S. Ct.
at 2320 n.9 (citing conflicting evidence of possible operation of Item Veto Act), the Court concluded
that "to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form is contrary to historical experience." /d. at
2322. For an argument that the Item Veto Act-irrespective of its impact on the balance of powerswill be struck down on nondelegation grounds, see Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto
Law, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
20. In reaching the case's merits, Justice Stevens found irrelevant those balance of powers concerns
that may well have proved decisive to the majority. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2325 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the Item Veto Act is inconsistent with the text of the Constitution).
21. !d. at 2322.
22. On this point, see generally Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: fh.e Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992). With regard to the 1996-1997 Term, see Cass R. Sunstein, Supreme
Caution; Once Again the High Court Takes Only Small Steps, WASH. PosT, July 6, 1997, at C 1.
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Jefferson sought an advisory opinion on certain policy questions confronting
President Washington's administration, the Court would remind the Congress
that the "three departments of government" are "checks upon each other" and
express its confidence that Congress "will discern what is right" through its
"usual prudence, decision, and firmness. " 23
Imagine now that Congress, still uncertain about the constitutionality of its
flag burning proposal, approves the measure with an effective date one year
after its enactment. This legislation, moreover, contains a provision that compels the Supreme Court to render an opinion about the bill's constitutionality
sometime before its effective date. Furthermore, to ensure that the Court has the
benefit of an adversarial presentation before it, the legislation specifies that the
Solicitor General, representing the United States, will defend the measure and
that members of Congress, serving as "counsel adversary," will oppose the
measure. Under this scheme, the Court would have before it a somewhat
artificial suit so that it can either approve or veto Congress's action. For this
reason, as was true in Muskrat v. United States, 24 the Court almost certainly
would consider Congress's request a call for an advisory opinion. In reaching
this conclusion, moreover, the Court might well refer to the Framers' rejection
of a Council of Revision consisting of the "Executive and a convenient number
of the National Judiciary ... with authority to examine every act of the National
Legislature before it shall operate." 25
These two hypotheticals, we think, are easy cases. The Constitution-as the
Framers' rejection of the Council of Revision makes clear--demarks judicial
power as separate and distinct from the lawmaking power?6 As such, the
prohibition against advisory opinions has been dubbed "the oldest and most
consistent" limitation on federal judicial power?7 Congress cannot create a
cause of action simply to satisfy itself that its handiwork, after all, is constitutional. Rather, Article III demands a real dispute launched by a party who can
claim that the law has adversely affected her.
Let us now shift from the hypothetical to the real. On March 21, 1995,
Senators Paul Simon (D-Ill.), a long-time sponsor of item veto reform, and Carl
Levin (D-Mich.), an item veto opponent, proposed an amendment "acceptable
23. Correspondence between Chief Justice Jay and Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, in PAUL M. BATOR
ET AL., HART AND WEcHsLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 67 (4th ed. 1988).
24. 219 U.S. 346 ( 1911) (treating congressional efforts to facilitate litigation over the constitutionality of a recently enacted law as a request for an advisory opinion).
25. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
26. James Madison, who pushed for the Council, saw it as a mechanism to limit "legislative excess"
by permitting judges to "add their wisdom to the law." Jeff Roedel, Stoking the Doctrinal Furnace:
Judicial Review and the New York Council of Revision, N.Y. HIST. 261, 275 (July 1988). The
Philadelphia Convention rejected this merger of functions, preferring that each branch operate within its
designated spheres of authority. See LoUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47 (2d ed. 1995);
David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SuP. CT. REv. 19, 40.
27. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 65 (5th ed. 1994); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 50 (1997) (describing advisory opinion ban as
"core of Article lli").
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to both sides. " 28 Authorizing any member of Congress to challenge the Act's
constitutionality and requiring expedited Supreme Court review of such challenges, Senator Simon explained: "What we do not want is to live in limbo ....
[Some constitutional experts have testified that it is constitutional; others have
testified that it is unconstitutional.] I do not know who is right. The courts have
to make that determination. But we ought to know as quickly as possible." 29
Levin added that the proposal was not unusual, that its "language tracks the
Gramm-Rudman judicial review language." 30 Other than a suggestion by Act
sponsor John McCain (R-Ariz.) that a severability clause be added to the
statute, 31 the Simon-Levin amendment prompted no discussion.
The Simon-Levin proposal, of course, set the stage for the Act's inclusion of
a congressional standing/expedited review provision. Moreover, the SimonLevin proposal hardly differs from our second flag burning hypothetical. To
start with, the expedited review provision was designed to facilitate a judicial
determination of constitutionality before the Act took effect. While congressional plaintiffs in Raines filed suit one day after the Item Veto Act technically
took effect, congressional sponsors understood that the President would not
have an opportunity to make use of his item veto power until some time after
the Supreme Court's anticipated decision. As Representative Nathan Deal (DGa.), House sponsor of the expedited review provision, recognized: "Hopefully,
the procedure established by my amendment will result in a final resolution
regarding the constitutionality of line-item veto authority before the ... appropriation bills are sent to the President." 32 Furthermore, although plaintiffs in
Raines voted against the Item Veto Act, the expedited review provision was
available to "any member of Congress" willing to launch a constitutional attack
against the Act. In other words, recognizing that the Supreme Court would insist
upon some type of an adversarial presentation, Congress established a mechanism whereby "any member" could perform a function that Item Veto Act
supporters and opponents both embraced-securing expedited judicial review
28. 141 CONG. REc. S4244 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon).
29. /d. Senator Simon's comments focused on an earlier version of the Act. With that said, there is
no doubt that the Act's congressional standing/expedited review provision was designed to resolve
continuing uncertainty about the Act's constitutionality. For example, at the 1995 Senate hearings, legal
experts divided on the question of whether Congress could statutorily grant item veto power to the
President. See The Line Item Veto: A Constitutional Approach: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., l 04th Con g. ( 1995). More significantly, the final version of the Act mimicked
a House proposal which included a congressional standing/expedited review provision ·for precisely the
same reasons articulated by Senator Simon. See 141 CoNG. REc. Hl138 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Deal) ("Since we are proceeding in a statutory form for a line item veto and not a
constitutional amendment, it should be obvious that until that constitutionality is clarified, it will be
under a cloud.").
30. 141 CONG. REc. S4245 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Levin).
31. See id. at S4244 (statement of Sen. McCain).
32. 141 CoNG. REc. H1139 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Deal). In making these
remarks, Representative Deal referred to the fiscal year 1996 appropriation bills. /d. Although the Item
Veto Act took effect on January I, 1997, Representative Deal's plan nonetheless came to fruition.
Raines was decided before Congress submitted its fiscal year 1998 appropriation bills to the President.
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of the Act's constitutionality. Accordingly, while item veto proponents filed an
amicus brief defending the Act's legality, 33 the appropriateness of the expedited
review provision was never called into doubt by any congressional filing. 34
In this situation, there was good reason for the Court to steer clear of an item veto
ruling on advisory opinion grounds?5 "The stuff of [constitutional] contests," wrote
then law professor Felix Frankfurter, "are facts, and judgment on facts." 36 The item
veto is a classic example of this ripeness concern within the advisory opinion
doctrine; only through experience can conclusions be drawn about the item veto's
impact on the balance of power. 37 An expedited ruling on the item veto's constitutionality then would yield little more than "sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities." 38
More fundamentally, Congress's attempt to draw the Court into the item veto flap
raises basic separation of powers problems, as we will explore in greater detail
below?9 The Court ought not to function as a Council of Revision on those constitutional questions that Congress cannot settle to its satisfaction. Although such decisions
might make government more efficient in the short term, over time they would
diminish the Court's ability to act as a distinctive countermajoritarian voice. 40
B. RAINES: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERBRANCH
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE

The flip side of this judicial independence concern is Congress's utilization of
advisory opinions to duck its responsibility to pass judgment on the constitutionality of its enactments. Expedited review provisions contained in several significant congressional enactments,41 including the Item Veto Act, reflect Congress's

33. Joint Brief of the United States Senate and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United
States House of Representatives as Amicus Curiae, Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997) (No.
96-1671) available in 1997 WL 251409.
34. See id. at *2 n.2 ("Amici express no position on the standing issue raised by appellants.").
35. The Court, for example, could have concluded that the parties were not truly adverse, in that
congressional plaintiffs were functioning as Congress's agents in a deal crafted by Act supporters and
opponents and acquiesced to by the White House. The Court, moreover, could have concluded that it
was indeterminate whether its decision would have some effect. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, supra note
27, at 53 (stating a case is a nonjusticiable request for an advisory opinion if there is not a "substantial
likelihood" of some effect); accord American Fed'n of Govt Employees v. United States, 634 F. Supp.
336, 340 (D. D.C.) ("[No] plaintiff has successfully argued that he had standing because he was likely
to be injured by legislation that had not yet been passed."), aff'd, 479 U.S. 801 (1986).
36. Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002 (1924).
37. For further discussion, see infra Part ill.
38. Frankfurter, supra note 36, at 1003.
39. See infra Part lB.
40. For this very reason, the Court in Muskrat rested its decision on advisory opinion grounds. See
Patrick C. McKeever & Billy Dwight Perry, Note, The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal
Judiciary, 50 GEO. L.J. 785, 805-06 (1962).
41 . Other enactments containing expedited constitutional review provisions include the Communications Decency Act, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act, and the Federal Election
Campaign Act. All three of these measures were invalidated on constitutional grounds. See Reno v.
ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997) (invalidating Communications Decency Act); Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (invalidating Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 143
(1976) (invalidating portions of Federal Election Campaign Act).
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desire to delegate this responsibility to the Court. 42 Unwilling to invest significant institutional resources into determining whether its most controversial laws
are constitutional, Congress appears quite willing to hand off this constitutional
responsibility to the Court.
While this phenomenon is hardly new and may well be inevitable, 43 Congress's dodging of its "duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning
and force of the Constitution " 44 is nonetheless disquieting. The congressional
role in shaping constitutional values has both formal as well as prudential roots.
Lawmakers do not, for example, swear their allegiance to the decisions of the
Supreme Court when taking their oath, but rather to "support this Constitution. " 45 Starting with the confirmation of judicial nominees, Congress also
places its imprimatur on Court decisionmaking. In addition, Congress affects
public acceptance of Court decisionmaking, sometimes by supporting and other
times by opposing Court decisionmaking. 46 Because interest-group pressures
affect courts and elected officials in different ways, a full-range consideration of
the costs, benefits, and background principles underlying different policy outcomes is best accomplished by a government-wide decisionmaking process.
Just as courts should eschew advisory opinions to better maintain the separation
of powers, Congress likewise needs to perform the legislative function of
passing judgment on the constitutionality of its enactments. 47 Without this
engagement, the Court may well begin to consider the Constitution as its
exclusive domain and, as such, may systematically discount the harm (to
representative democracy) of striking down elected government actions. Put
another way: Just as the Court informs Congress about the meaning of the
Constitution, Congress too should educate the Court.48
42. This point was raised during oral arguments in Raines. In questioning respondent's counsel, Alan
Morrison, one of the Justices expressed "concern that if this Court is routinely invited to be the referee
for legislative matters that the legislators themselves will not take the constitutional positions that they
ought to . ... "Transcript of Oral Argument at *40, Raines v. Byrd, No. 96-1671 1997 WL 276080
(U.S. May27, 1997) [hereinafterTranscript].
43 . See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARv. L. REv. 129, 137-38, 152, 157 (1893) (counselling against legislative reliance on Court
interpretations of the Constitution).
44. City of Boerne v. Flores, ll7 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1997). We note the irony of this cite, for the
Boerne Court trashed Congress for advancing an interpretation of the First Amendment at odds with
earlier Court decisions.
45. U.S. CoNST. art. VI. For a general consideration of this question, see Symposium: Perspectives on the
Authoritativeness of Supreme Coun Decisions, 61 TuL. L. REv. 977,985-86,994-1001, 101 i-13 (1987).
46. See generally LoUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, PoLmCAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITlJTIONAL LAW (2d
ed. 1996).
47. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 585, 586-87 (1975).
48. For competing perspectives on the necessity of court/elected government dialogues, see Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, llO HARv. L. REv.
1359, 1360 (1997) (arguing that Congress is 'duty-bound' to follow Supreme Court interpretations of
the Constitution); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, VA. L.
REv. (forthcoming 1998) (arguing court/elected government dialogues are necessary to law's ability to
settle disputes).
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Unfortunately, the Court in Raines not only failed to address this issue, but
instead exacerbated the problem by its characterization of the case. Rather than
suggest that Congress ought to take seriously its duty to interpret the Constitution, the Court spoke of its "natural urge" to "settle ... this important dispute"
and promised Congress and the nation that it ultimately would deliver a
definitive interpretation of the item veto's constitutionality. 49 In this respect,
although bathed in the rhetoric of the passive virtues, Raines is a paean to
judicial supremacy. The Court's "no standing" holding returns the item veto to
elected government, but offers little incentive for Congress to invest more
energy in assessing the constitutionality of its actions.
To be sure, those who believe that Congress is not "ideologically committed
or institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values" may
question the practicality of such an effort. 5 From this perspective, admonitions
that Congress closely evaluate the constitutional meaning of its work seem
hollow, even perhaps counterproductive. Under this view, equating the role of
Congress with that of the Court might diminish the Court's own power to speak
with true authority about our collective constitutional vision. Based on this and
similar concerns, scholars have criticized civic republican proposals that the
Court exercise heightened judicial review as a means of transforming legislative
deliberations. 51
Despite practical limitations to direct judicial oversight of legislative deliberations, a considered "remand to the legislature" in this context seems qualitatively different from proposals for heightened judicial review. The Court would
not be formalistically commanding that Congress undertake its responsibilities
in a public-spirited or civic republican manner, but rather structuring the judicial
process so that Congress would be forced to face the consequences of its
judgments, at least briefly, and have the opportunity to express views on its
constitutionality without hiding behind immediate judicial resolution. 5 2 In other

°

49. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318; see also id. at 2325 (Souter, J., concurring) ("The virtue of waiting
for a private suit is only confirmed by the certainty that another suit can come to us.").
50. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Fonns of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1979); see also Abner
J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REv. 587, 610
(1983) (arguing that lawmakers have little incentive to seriously consider constitutional questions). For
an opposing view, see Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L.
REv. 707, 746 (1985) (arguing Congress has institutional capacity to interpret the Constitution).
51. See Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1651, 1653-54 (1988); Jerry Mashaw, As if Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685,
1691-92 (1988).
52. Another example of this phenomenon is the Court's rewriting of legislation through its selfdeclared power to make severable (unless Congress specifies otherwise) unconstitutional provisions of
otherwise valid enactments. "Judicial willingness to stand in for Congress," as Michael Dorf points
out, "not only blurs the lines of power between the branches, but also encourages congressional
laziness in matters of constitutional principle." Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and
Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235, 293 (1994). Congress, unfortunately, appears to endorse this
default rule. When Congress considered the Item Veto Act, for example, Gerald Solomon (R-NY) noted
that "[n]o severability or nonseverability provisions were included in the bill, but it is the intention of
the conferees [consistent with the current rule of thumb] that any judicial determinations regarding the
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words, it would simply be establishing a structure-implicit in the prohibition
against advisory opinions-for facilitating greater congressional accountability.
We think the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to discuss these principles in Raines. The decision should have focused on Congress as an institution, not weaknesses in the claims of individual members. In so doing, the Court
could have admonished Congress to heed James Bradley Thayer's warning
against the political function implicit in judicial review "dwarf[ing] the political
capacity of the people" and "deaden[ing] its sense of moral responsibility." 53
These fundamental concerns, which underlie the advisory opinion prohibition,
were squarely before the Court in Raines. Judicial authority seems particularly
strong at such moments-requiring the political branches of government to
assume responsibility for their own actions and engage in interbranch dialogue
over constitutional meaning.
II. THE

(SUPREME COURT'S) PROBLEM WITH CONGRESSIONAL STANDING

Although the failure of the Court to confront the advisory opinion issue may
have been animated by its Bickelian fear of confronting the legislative branch
directly, the Court also appears to have been motivated by its desire to confront
the issue of congressional standing proactively. 5 4 At first blush, this might seem
to be an odd timing decision, since Congress (with the President's blessing)
embraced this lawsuit when it amended the Act to provide for expedited judicial
review. The Court, however, misdescribed these facts in its opinion, suggesting
instead that congressional plaintiffs "ha[d] not been authorized to represent"
Congress's institutional interests (a "fact" that the Court "attache[d] some
importance to"). 55 This sleight of hand shifted the focus away from the advisory nature of the Court's decision and to the appropriateness of disappointed
lawmakers invoking the Court's jurisdiction to settle a score with their colleagues. It also allowed the Court to bring Raines into the fold of recent
standing decisions, which link standing to the separation of powers. 56
Why did the Court wish to reach out and address the legality of congressional
standing? The answer, we suspect, is that the Supreme Court intended to send a
message to the D.C. Circuit in a case with few practical consequences. Starting
in 1974, the D.C. Circuit opened a window for lawmakers-suing in their
official capacity-to defend their legislative prerogatives in court. 57 Although
constitutionality of the bill be applied severably to the legislation." 142 CoNG. REc. H2973, H2974
(daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (remarks by Rep. Solomon).
53. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND FELIX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1967).
54. Raines leaves little doubt that, for the Supreme Court, congressional standing is an invitation to
disaster, risking "public esteem" by "plung[ing]" the Court into bitter political battles. Raines, 117
S. Ct. at 2321-22.
55. /d. at 2314, 2322.
56. /d. at 2317 ("[T]he law of Art. ill standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation
of powers." (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
57. See, e.g., Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241,
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most of these disputes were thrown out on "equitable discretion" grounds,
disappointed congressmen would regularly trot down to the U.S. Courthouse,
make a speech, and file papers challenging, say, the President's authority to
terminate a treaty or launch a military invasion.
The Supreme Court opposed this practice and Raines proved a wonderful
opportunity to make this point. In critical respects, Raines is a purely hypothetical dispute. Lawmaker plaintiffs could not point to any concrete harm they
suffered as a result of something the President or Congress did; rather, Raines
was entirely prospective, focusing on harms lawmakers anticipated suffering in
budget negotiations with their colleagues as well as through the President's
anticipated exercise of his item veto power. Moreover, because there would be a
"plaintiff who obviously would have standing" to challenge the President's use
of the item veto, 58 Raines was deemed inconsequential. For example, Raines's
plaintiff Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.) discounted the no standing finding as "just a
temporary setback." 59 Finally, by leaving for another day the question of
whether lawmakers could challenge otherwise nonjusticiable conduct, Raines
sounded a strong message on lawmaker standing in a nearly unanimous, nondivisive ruling.
In opposing the standing of lawmakers suing in their official capacities, 60
Raines sought to merge pragmatics and principle. The principle is the separation
of powers, the notion that each branch is the master of its domain. Congress
should speak the voice of Congress; the President (perhaps through his delegee,
the Solicitor General) should speak the voice of the Executive. Court involvement in matters internal to the legislative or executive branches, as suggested by
the advisory opinion prohibition, is inappropriate. 5 1
Raines also makes clear that judicial recognition of lawmaker standing is
pragmatically unwise. Lawmaker standing thrusts the courts into the midst of
intrabranch and interbranch disputes before the underlying claims can be fairly
assessed. Moreover, "by embroiling the federal courts in a power contest nearly
244-45 (1981); Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as a Counterweight?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 63, 66, 78-79 (1992). In approving congressional standing, however, the
D.C. Circuit has held that lawmakers must meet the same Article ill requirements as other plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946,950-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
58. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2325 (Souter, J., concurring). Designated beneficiaries of an appropriation,
for example, would certainly have standing to challenge the President's "item vetoing" of their
benefits. At the same time, ripeness concerns may prevent the Supreme Court from resolving such a
claim. See infra Part illc.
59. Robert Pear, Court Allows Clinton the Line-Item Veto, N.Y. TIMEs, June 27, 1997, at A21. The
Court's conclusion that lawmakers carmot launch judicial challenges in their official capacities did not
prompt a single comment in either the House or Senate. As such, Raines's most significant accomplishment went unnoticed.
60. Lawmakers sometimes sue in their private capacities. When Adam Clayton Powell challenged
his exclusion from the House of Representatives, for example, his claimed loss of salary was a concrete
private harm. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318 (discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)).
. 61. For reasons outlined in the first part of this essay, a dismissal of the lawsuit on advisory opinion
grounds would have best served separation of powers values. See supra text accompanying notes
44-53.
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at the height of its political tension," lawmaker standing "expose[s] the Judicial
Branch to [significant] risk." 62 Embracing these values, Raines seems a classic
expression of "the passive virtues," "an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in
our kind of government" 63 invoking Article III to shield itself from the harsh,
unforgiving world of politics.
Raines's certainty that the costs of lawmaker standing outweighs its benefits
begs the question of why the D.C. Circuit, for more than two decades, reached
precisely the opposite result. An explanation emerges, however, if the separation
of powers is seen as "a system of bargains" between the branches. 64 Unlike the
Supreme Court, whose institutional prestige is often tied to individual rights
cases, much of the D.C. Circuit's institutional prestige is attached to structural
cases. Correspondingly, the D.C. Circuit, as Judge Patricia Wald put it, sees
itself "especially well-equipped to play" a leadership role on separation of
powers and administrative law issues: "We are located just down the avenue
from Congress and just up the street from the White House. Several D.C.
Circuit judges have been members of Congress, and most of us have held
policymaking executive positions." 65 By participating in interbranch battles as
well as intramural squabbles between agencies with independent litigation
authority and the Justice Department,66 the D.C. Circuit has good reason to see
itself as a player and the government as disunitary. For this reason, the D.C.
Circuit has much to gain-:-in terms of power and prestige-by adjudicating
lawmaker challenges to congressional and executive action.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has good reason to steer clear of these cases.
Concerns of interbranch harmony matter more to a Court whose influence and
reputation do not hinge on the resolution of separation of powers and administrative law disputes. For example, to maximize its power to speak the last word on
individual rights disputes, the Court may find it advantageous to trade off to the
elected branches the power to sort out foreign affairs, war powers, and other
structural matters. 67 Beyond the Court's particularized interest in individual
62. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2324 (Souter, J., concurring).
63. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,
699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Allen's invocation of Judge
Robert Bork's Vander Jagt opinion is noteworthy, for Judge Bork used Vander Jagt as a vehicle to
express his disapproval of the D.C. Circuit's sometimes acceptance of congressional standing.
64. McGinnis, supra note 17, at 304; see also Fitts, supra note 8, at 1666.
65. Patricia M. Wald, Symposium: The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40
ADMIN. L. REv. 507,513 (1988).
66. See Neal E. Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush White House's Failed
Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1035, 1048-50 (1994) (describing incentives for
D.C. Circuit to encourage intragovernrnentallitigation).
67. See McGinnis, supra note 17, at 306. Under this view, the Court is far more likely to defend its
institutional turf on individual rights matters. There is much support for this proposition. In its 1992
reaffirmation of abortion rights-Planned Parenthood v. Casey-the Court claimed the authority to
resolve the abortion dispute, invoking "the Nation's commitment to the rule of law" and declaring that
"the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution." 505 U.S. 833,
867, 869 (1992). More recently, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court castigated Congress for not
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rights, the Supreme Court is far more likely than lower courts to take social and
political forces into account. Acknowledging that it can neither appropriate
funds nor command the military, the Court recognizes that its power lies "in its
legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the
people's acceptance of the Judiciary." 68 As psychologists Tom Tyler and Gregory Mitchell observed, the Court seems to believe that "public acceptance of
the Court's role as interpreter of the Constitution-that is, the public belief in
the Court's institutional legitimacy-enhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions." 69 Throwing itself into the middle of disputes between
disappointed lawmakers and either the Congress or the White House opens the
Court up to political retaliation and, as such, is a gambit the Court is disinclined
to take. 70 The Court in Raines was well aware of these high stakes, acknowledging the "risk[s]" to its "public esteem" by "improperly and unnecessarily"
participating in political battles over the separation of powers. 71
The Court, as Alexander Bickel put it, "exists in a Lincolnian tension of
principle and expediency." 72 Raines exemplifies this tension, leaving open the
possibility of lawmaker standing being recognized in an otherwise nonjusticiable controversy while invoking the "passive virtue" of steering clear of
quintessentially political disputes. Raines's balancing act, moreover, reveals the
Court's power to frame the issues before it. For the most part, the Court
accomplishes this task through its certiorari power. In Raines, however, the
Court had no choice but to hear the case. The lower court's invalidation of the
Item Veto Act (and its accompanying approval of standing) as well as Congress's expedited review provision compelled the Court to act and to act
quickly. The Court's desire to address lawmaker standing, of course, made this a
rather easy pill to swallow. 73

giving due respect to "judicial interpretations of the [First Amendment] already issued." 117 S. Ct.
2157, 2172 (1997).
68. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion).
69. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and Empowennent of Discretionary Legal
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 715 (1994).
70. For similar reasons, the Court prefers that the Solicitor General unify the views of federal
departments and agencies. In FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, for example, the Court---<>n its own
motion-refused to allow the FEC, an independent agency, to file a certiorari petition without first
receiving Solicitor General approval. 513 U.S. 88,99 (1994).
71. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2324,2321-22.
72. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 50.
73. This description suggests that Raines's no standing finding is rooted in pragmatics, not principle.
We think that description is fair. First, standing doctrine is notoriously malleable. For example, while
Raines trivializes the harm lawmakers suffer when they negotiate a budget deal in the shadow of an
allegedly unconstitutional law, the Court has validated such claims of process harms in other settings.
See Bruce K. Miller & Neal E. Devins, Constitutional Rights Without Remedies: Judicial Review of
Underinclusive Legislation, 70 JUDICATURE 151 (1986) (contrasting cases in which the Court approves
process-based harms with cases in which it rejects process harms); Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded
Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1422, 1424, 1455-61 (1995) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries,
1993 SUP. Cr. REv. 37, 47-51 (same). Second, to facilitate its invocation of separation of powers
values, the Court miscasts the dispute in Raines. Third, it is hard to square the Court's strong words on
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III. RIPENESS, THE ITEM VETO, AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

In light of this history, the most revealing aspect of the decision in Raines
may be what it says about the Court's desire and ability to time the judicial
resolution of the various constitutional issues presented in the case. On the one
hand, the Court decided to accelerate its confrontation with the D.C. Circuit; on
the other hand the Court decided to delay-or perhaps avoid-potential confrontations with the Congress and executive branch on the constitutionality of the
accelerated review provision and the item veto itself. Pointing to the prudential
advantages of delay, concurring Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
specifically noted their agreement with the majority decision only because they
were confident the constitutional challenge to the Item Veto Act would return to
the Court. 74 While the Raines majority did not technically rely on ripeness
analysis, the underlying principles behind the doctrine-to avoid premature
entanglements "in abstract disagreements with other organs of government"clearly underlay their reasoning. 75
A. THE VALUE OF DELAY IN THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CONTEXT

Why was delay so important in the case of the item veto? Of course, many of
the traditional arguments for delay, as expressed in the ripeness doctrine and
described above, could be advanced in Raines. The procedural device that was
being challenged-the item veto--had not yet been exercised; the exact nature
and circumstances of its likely effectloin the first test case thus remained subject
to debate. There was also the possibility-however slight-that any constitutional confrontation with the legislative and executive branches would be
avoided should the item veto never be exercised, as the Solicitor General
seemed at one point to speculate at oral argument. 76 Moreover, even if the
"confrontation" might not be avoided, the issues might be framed differently in
a subsequent suit brought by a private party. As Justice Souter observed in his
concurring opinion, "just as the presence of a party beyond the Government
places the Judiciary at some remove from the political forces, the need to await
injury to such a plaintiff allows the courts some greater separation in the time
between the political resolution and the judicial review. " 77 In other words, the
passage of time and the presence of a private injured litigant might afford the
lawmaker standing with two aspects of its holding. To begin with, the dilemma lawmaker standing
poses for the Court is no different in otherwise nonjusticiable cases than in otherwise justiciable cases.
The difference, instead, is the Court's "natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of [an] important
dispute." Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317. While the Court may ultimately conclude that lawmakers lack
standing in otherwise nonjusticiable cases, Raines's exemption of that category of dispute from its
holding makes little doctrinal sense. Furthermore, it is hard to square Raines with Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 (1939), a case that allowed state lawmakers to challenge the alleged nullification of their
votes. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2328 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
74. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2325 (Souter, J., concurring).
75. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 163 (1987).
76. See Transcript, supra note 42, at *18.
77. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2324-25 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Court a better understanding of how the item veto would actually work and
protect its political independence to reach the best result.
In our view, however, these classic arguments do not justify the ultimate
decision to delay in this case. The fact that Congress wished to accelerate
constitutional review and make the item veto effective for only the next two
administrations suggests it had doubts about the Act. 78 Indeed, many legislators,
even those who supported the Act, seemed quite willing for the Court to
intervene, or at least did not appear to be preparing for a pitched battle. When
one compares the item veto case to 1996-97 Term decisions invalidating
congressional initiatives, all of which were more politically charged, a confrontation with Congress over the item veto does not seem so daunting. 79 To the
contrary, some might even claim delay undermined the Court's political position; deciding the item veto in this relatively abstract context, before the
winners and losers of operation were clear, could have had certain political
advantages. 80
Moreover, on the opposite side of the ledger, the Court's refusal to reach the
merits arguably had present effects on legislators and the public, as Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent. 81 While almost every law or regulation
influences current thinking and behavior before it is implemented, the item
veto's proactive impact seems qualitatively different. In contrast to most cases
in which complainants seek to initiate early review, the underlying purpose of
the item veto--cited by proponents and foes alike-was to sway legislative
deliberations and decisions prior to its exercise, in other words, to change the
plaintiffs' current .behavior, as they alleged in their complaint. 82 After the item
veto was passed, President Clinton even speculated that he might not need to
78. The Act sunsets the veto in 2005. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 691.
79. In his end-of-term wrap-up, David Savage, who covers the Supreme Court for the Los Angeles
Times, put it this way: "Boldly striking down newly enacted laws, the justices showed little regard for
the power and prerogatives of the lawmakers who meet on the opposite side of First Street, N.E."
David G. Savage, Supreme Coun Grants States a Power Surge, L.A. TiMEs, June 19, 1997, at Al. See
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (holding that Congress could not criminalize pornography on
the internet); City of Boernes v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding that Congress could not grant
more protection to religious freedom than what is required in the Constitution); Printz v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (holding that Congress could not require state or local officials to enforce
federal gun-control regulation).
80. The same can be said of the congressional standing issue, that is, the abstractness of Raines
reduced the political costs of a Court holding on lawmaker standing.
81. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. As several congressional proponents of the Item Veto Act have suggested, the use of the item
veto may be limited because the mere existence of that power vested in the President could discourage
Congress from adding pork to appropriation bills in the first place. See, e.g., 142 CoNG. REc. S2987,
S2988 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Craig) ("Knowing that any individual provision
may have to return to Congress one more time to stand on its own merits will promote more responsible
legislation in the first place. In short, embarrassing items will not be sneaked into these bills in the first
place."); id. at S2981 (statement of Sen. Biden) (arguing that the Line-Item Veto Act will "shift the
incentives now in our system to attach special-interest spending to our appropriations bills."); id. at
S2957 (statement of Sen. Stevens) (asserting that the line-item veto will be instrumental in creating a
more disciplined Congress).
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use the device since its purpose was to impose fiscal discipline upon Congress. 83 Whatever the doctrinal pigeonhole, there were important prudential and
political reasons supporting early review in this case.
To justify delay in Raines, therefore, one needs to take account of the special
values of ripeness in modem separation of powers confrontations. The normal
ripeness doctrine, as described above, was developed for a paradigmatic challenge to a statute or administrative regulation that is yet to be implemented.
Thus, the applicable standard has been, under the classic test set forth in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 84 whether the harm to the plaintiffs resulting from
delay is offset by the need for the Court to resolve the dispute through the prism
of an actual case following implementation. The assumption is that, by allowing
a specific case with. real parties to be presented to the court, delay may avoid the
controversy or make the issues in the dispute more refined. Time may also
reduce the tenor of political argument in the other branches, which are no longer
involved in the debate over its passage.
But separation of powers confrontations can differ in important respects from
the traditional challenge to a congressional statute. Delay not only allows the
Court to consider the constitutionality of the item veto in a suit involving its
exercise, but only after the legislative and executive branches have had to
respond over time to the exercise of the veto in a series of other situations as
well. This repeat player aspect to separation of powers disputes distinguishes
them from many traditional constitutional challenges; the branches are forced
over time to react to and make accommodations with each other-and perhaps
articulate new constitutional positions-in the shadow of the implementation of
the law.
Of course, the implementation of virtually any statute produces some response by political institutions. Yet in many constitutional controversies, the
new decision rule adopted by Congress, such as a ban on firearms, is less likely
to be bargained around by national political institutions with independent
political and constitutional positions. In the separation of powers context, the
frequent interplay between the branches can make the ultimate impact of a new
rule quite unpredictable, as the political accommodations between the branches
can redefine or even undo the substantive impact. 85 The decision striking down
the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha 86 is perhaps the best example; the ultimate
effect of the new rule turned out to be quite different than originally predicted,

83. For a discussion of how Clinton has in fact used the veto, see infra notes 93 and 102 and
accompanying text.
84. 387 U.S. 136, 147 (1967).
85. Bickel recognized that delaying litigation had the advantage of allowing the· "full political and
historical context, the relationship between the Court and the representative institutions of government," to be made clearer. BICKEL, supra note 9, at 124. Our point is that, in the modem separation of
powers context, it also illuminates the relationship of "the representative institutions of government" to
each other. /d.
86. 462 u.s. 919, 959 (1983).
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as the branches made extensive accommodations to work around the decision. 87
The approach of the legislative and executive branches to controversies over
foreign affairs and executive privilege has similarly redefined the meaning of
the constitutional decision rules over time. 88
This phenomenon provides the best explanation for the Court's quite extraordinary discussion in Raines of the failure by various legislative and executive
figures over the years to bring suits challenging laws before they had been
implemented. 89 This is fascinating constitutional history, but unusual precedent
for a decision of the Court. Rather than resolve the issue of congressional
standing through an exploration of traditional constitutional principles, the
Court placed its greatest reliance on the failure of the various members of the
branches in assorted cases over the years to challenge the other branch proactively through suit.
,
On a purely formal level, as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the failure
of members of the branches to bring suit says little about how the Court would
or should have resolved such a suit. If one's theory of constitutional methodology is limited to the original intent of the Framers, judicial precedent, and
constitutional text, then the practices of the branches are of marginal relevance.90 But for those who view the decision as necessarily informed by
constitutional practice-as the debate over the item veto and the Court majority's discussion of the history of congressional standing suggest-the value of
current constitutional custom is readily apparent. 91
B. THE VALUE OF DELAY IN RAINES

How would the experience with the item veto, like experience with legislator
lawsuits, be illuminating? First, it might offer some preliminary evidence about
the item veto's impact on the overall balance of powers. One important question
is whether the item veto will drive the existing equilibrium of checks and
balances out of equipoise, as the extraordinary formal responsibility vested in

87. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
273, 275 (1993); Fitts, supra note 8 (analyzing this issue from a "political transaction cost," or Coasian
perspective).
88. See LoUIS FISHER, PREsiDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995); Neal E. Devins, Congressional-Executive
Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 109, llO (1996)
(indicating that Congress and the executive branch have been unwilling to trade political solutions to
interbranch conflict for judicial resolution); McGinnis, supra note 17, at 305-08, 325-25; Peter M.
Shane, Learning McNamara's Lessons: How the War Powers Resolution Advances the Rule of Law, 47
CASE W. REs. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997); Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreements and Negotiation in a
Government of Law: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REv. 461,
465-66 (1987) (stating that each branch has an independent view of executive privilege entitled to
primacy in its own "jurisdiction," but co-equal status with others in different contexts).
89. See Raines, ll7 S. Ct. at 2320-21.
90. See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers QuestionsA Foolish Inconsistency, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488, 493 (1987).
91. On the role of custom in separation of powers decisionmaking, see Michael J. Glennon, The Use
of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REv. 109, ll5-16 (1984).
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the President by the item veto might suggest. Proponents and defenders take
different sides, dividing on whether Congress will be able to respond through
other devices to check any presidential overreaching. 92 For its part, the Clinton
administration signalled before the decision that the President might not make
aggressive use of the item veto. 93 The Court in Raines recognized this possibility. Noting in a footnote that the President might find it politically costly to
utilize the item veto, 94 the Court made clear that it was too soon to draw
conclusions about the item veto's significance.
Apart from these systemic interbranch concerns, there is a separate substantive policy issue of whether the item veto will work to improve the quality of
specific legislation. Will it be used by the President to threaten individual
members of Congress simply to pursue executive pet projects, as opponents
claimed?95 Or will it serve to check the perverse micromotives of individual
members, as its supporters hope?96 In other words, will it transform the substantive quality of legislation in a significant way, and if so, in what direction?
In several recent separation of powers confrontations, the Court has had the
advantage of such history. The legislative veto, for example, enjoyed wide
usage before it was struck down in Chadha, as had the special prosecutor
92. See Devins, supra note 8; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Anicle /,
Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).
93. At oral argument, the Solicitor General speculated that the President might not exercise the veto,
as did Clinton at a news conference immediately following its passage. The President, of course, has
made use of the item veto since Raines. Whether these invocations should be construed as either de
minimis or signficant, however, seems more a function of one's baseline than anything else. See, e.g.,
John M. Broder, Clinton Cuts a Bit of Fat Off the Pork, NEW ORLEANS TiMEs, Oct. 18, 1997, at Al4
(President "has deferred to Congress on the overwhelming majority of projects that members added to
budget bills"); Robert Reno, Clinton Vetoes and Annoys, GREENSBORO NEWS & REcoRD, Oct. 22, 1997,
at Al5 ("[A]s a practical weapon in the real political world, [the item veto] is less lethal than a poleax
if more annoying than a peashooter."); see also infra notes 99, 102.
94. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2320 n.9.
95. During congressional debate, many congressmen expressed concern that a president could force
an undesirable congressional response by merely threatening to use the item veto. See, e.g., 142 CONG.
REc. S2941 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("This new power of rescissions will be
used by a President to threaten and coerce and intimidate members of the legislative branch to give the
President what he wants or he will cut the projects and programs that our constituents need and
want."); id. at S2969 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bumpers) (confessing that, as
governor, he threatened the use of the item veto to "get legislators in line" and that the president would
use the power to coerce lawmakers to vote a particular way); id. at H3010 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement
of Rep. Roukerna) (same); id. at H3002 (daily ed. at Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Slaughter) (same).
Similarly, congressman opposed to the Item Veto Act have argued that a president could use it
compel members of Congress to vote for his own pet projects. See, e.g., id. at H2976 (daily ed. Mar. 28,
1996) (statement of Rep. Beilenson) ("[The President] will use this new line item veto authority as a
threat to secure appropriations he wants funded."); id. at S2965-66 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Levin) ("[A] president could push his agenda in congress by threatening to use the line-item
veto. . . . Such threats could be used to . . . increase federal funding for projects favored by the
President."); id. at H2978 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs) (demonstrating how
President Reagan could have used the line-item veto to secure funding for the Contras); id. at S2969
(daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Bumpers) (demonstrating how President Bush could have
used the item veto to ensure passage of the Utah Wilderness Bill).
96. See Devins, supra note 8.
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provtswn upheld in Morrison v. Olson. 97 Indeed, even with the extensive
background before the Court at the time of these decisions, we have learned a
great deal about these devices from subsequent practice, which was not available to the Court at the time of decision. 98 Because the item veto will be
implemented in the context of a series of interconnections between the branches,
the institutions of government undoubtedly will condition its exercise in innumerable ways.
In addition to the information it offers about the actual operation of the item
veto, delay is valuable because of its political impact-it increases the likelihood that Congress will be forced into expressing more developed views on the
operation and constitutionality of the item veto. As noted above, one of the
problems with the accelerated judicial review provision and the "behind the
veil" vote by Congress was the lack of legislative debate over the Act's
constitutionality. Not surprisingly, after the first few exercises of the item veto,
some legislators are having second thoughts about their original support for the
law. 99 The Court could be aided considerably by the views of the other branches
on the constitutionality of the item veto in light of this experience.
This latter argument, it is important to note, stands the traditional ripeness
analysis on its head. Under the standard theory, delay should place time and
distance between the Court and the democratically elected legislature. 100 Here,
delay may produce the opposite effect, as the legislative body that refused to
take a constitutional position when it originally voted for the legislation "behind the veil" is now confronted over time with its actual operation. This was
one reason why the use of fast-track statutes by the Court raises such serious
prudential concerns, and should have been turned aside. The problem was not
that expedited procedures left the Court too close to the constitutional politics of
Congress, but the reverse; it gave Congress distance from the item veto and
97. 87 U.S. 654, 654 (1988).
98. Recently, several academics have questioned the effectiveness and the appropriateness of the
independent counsel in light of this history. See generally TERRY EASTIAND, Ennes, PoLmcs, AND TilE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL: EXECUTIVE POWER, EXECUTIVE VICE 1789-1989 (1989); Steven G. Calabresi,
Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23, 92-95 (1995) (suggesting
that frequent use of independent investigations poses risk of partisan abuse, encourages distrust of
government and government officials, and prevents government from addressing the real problems of
the nation); Statutory Interpretation-Ethics in Government Act- Eighth Circuit Holds Attorney General's Referral of Matters to Independent Counsel to be NonReviewable. United States v. TUcker, 78 F. 3d
1313 (8th Cir. 1996), cen. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct 7, 1996) (No. 95-2013), 110 HARv. L.
REv. 793, 797-98 (1997); Peter W. Rodino, The Case for the Independent Counsel, 19 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 5, 24-31 (1994) (supporting use of special prosecutors, but admitting that the current system is
flawed). For discussions of Chadha's impact, see Fisher, supra note 87; Fitts, supra note 8, at 1666.
99. In signing a recent veto, President Clinton himself observed, "I know that a lot of members who
voted for the line-item veto in Congress now wonder whether they did the right thing now that I'm
exercising it." Lisa Hoffman Scripps, Clinton Wields Line-Item Veto Lightly: Congress Piles Up 750
Pet Projects on Military Spending Bill; President Kills Just 13 of Them, RocKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 15,
1997, at32A.
100. Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2324 (Souter, J., concurring).
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deprived the Court of Congress's considered opinion of the item veto after it
observed its operation. In recent years there have been several other instances in
which Congress and/or individual legislators have sought strategic advantage by
institutionally avoiding greater political accountability. The best example may
be Gramm-Rudman, which not coincidentally also included a fast track judicial
review provision. 101 Delaying review in such cases may" lead Congress to
assume at least some greater constitutional responsibility.
Depending on how the Court ultimately resolves the issue, there also may be
a strategic advantage to this approach-though, once again, for a somewhat
different reason than the classic Bickelian analysis suggests. While time supposedly increases distance from the controversy and causes political participants to
become more detached, in this instance it may actually bring them back into the
fray-potentially on the side of the Court. Unlike most constitutional "confrontations," it must be remembered, the Court in Raines is faced with both the
executive and legislative branches initially approving of the change. Entering
the fray immediately might have required the Court to challenge the formal
positions of both branches. With time, as the real winners and losers become
apparent, the politics of the item veto may transform the controversy before the
Court.
Of course, this raises the question of how much time. Our personal view: a
period sufficient to allow the President to exercise the veto in a variety of
different political contexts and for Congress to respond. The first few exercises
of the veto since its passage have been tentative and subsequent interbranch
bargaining fairly extensive. 102 Only time will tell whether this brief history
confirms predictions that the item veto will be less significant than many
opponents and supporters have predicted.
C. THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE

If all these reasons exist for delay, why didn't the Court simply base its
decision specifically on ripeness grounds-the doctrine most focused on timing? The answer is not certain, though there are a number of likely reasons.
For one, it is not clear whether the ripeness concerns in this case are of
constitutional dimension. The doctrinal distinction is important because Congress effectively waived any prudential concerns by passing the accelerated
judicial review provision. The cases and the commentary on whether ripeness is
101 . There are others examples as well, especially in the area of foreign affairs. See McGinnis, supra
note 17, at 306 (stating that Congress has rationally shunned operational control of war and foreign
policy matters in favor of criticizing the Executive's performance after the fact).
102. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Moreover, bargaining within Congress and among
interest groups has intensified. See Guy Gugliotta & Eric Pianin, Line-Item Veto Tips Traditional
Balance of Power, Capitol Hill Plots Strategy to Counter President's Pen, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1997,
at AI (describing changes in congressional bargaining); David E. Rosenbaum, New Veto Alters Way
Washington Works, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22, 1997, at A20 (describing changes in interest
group and OMB negotiations).
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constitutionally based are divided, 103 as were the Justices themselves at oral
argument. 104 Indeed, many who argue the ripeness doctrine is constitutionally
based have limited their claims to delays needed for a delineation of the issues
in the case, not due to hardship to the parties or, alternatively, ripeness of the
issues in the broad sense articulated here.
More important, a ripeness claim would have precluded the Court from
reaching out and addressing the congressional standing issue. Like the Congress
that passed the line-item veto in the first place, the Court may have wished to
address this issue in a relatively theoretical context, that is, to place a check on
the evolution of the D.C. Circuit doctrine at a point when that doctrine had only
limited significance to the parties. 105 There are obvious tactical advantages in
deciding issues preemptively, as the Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison 106
demonstrated long ago. 107 As an internal matter, it also may have allowed the
Court to reach a consensus on the general approach to congressional standing
without resolving internally how the nuances of that doctrine would be applied
in future cases.
Nevertheless, a holding on ripeness grounds in Raines might have afforded
the Court doctrinal support for delaying decision in a future case brought by a
private party before sufficient time has elapsed. As has been observed over the
years, the well-documented ambiguity of standing in general and ripeness in
particular offers prudential advantages. Because the standing doctrine is not "a
highly principled and predictable process," it can afford the Court the "judicial
discretion to engage in such avoidance of decision" and the "flexibility needed
to discharge the [A]rticle III function wisely." 108 In the present context, the
preferred moment for judicial intervention, we have suggested, would only be
after the Court has had an opportunity to observe the exercise of the item veto in
a variety of political contexts. This may not be the case if a challenge is brought
by a private party this term. Under our policy analysis of the case, therefore,
application of an expanded ripeness doctrine might well be appropriate, if not in
Raines, then in some future challenge by a private party if brought at a point
when the branches have not had substantial experience with the item veto.
CONCLUSION

In The Least Dangerous Branch, perhaps the most influential work ever
published in constitutional law, Alexander Bickel explored the Supreme Court's
use of jurisdictional and procedural devices to modulate its interactions with the
103. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURJSDicrJON 116 (1989); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 78 (2d ed. 1988); Nichol, supra note 75, at 155-56.
104. See Transcript, supra note 42, at *5-8.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
106. 5 U.S. (5 Cranch) 137 (1803).
107. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1, 6-33
(describing the history of Marbury v. Madison).
108. TRIBE, supra note 103, at 87.
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elected branches of government. Bickel's predominant concern, of course, was
with the Court's lack of democratic legitimacy; these devices, he reasoned,
would ensure that issues before the Court were more fully developed for adjudicative
resolution and the Court would not become prematurely entangled in controversies
with the elected branches of government. The passive virtues, therefore, were one of
the important ways the Court retained legitimacy and influence within a government of competing and otherwise more powerful elected institutions.
Bickel wrote, however, at a time when many current trends in modem
government had not fully matured, or at least were not widely recognized. 109
These changes include the rise of the modem administrative state; the extensive
political and legal interplay between the legislative and administrative bureaucracies on a weekly if not daily basis; and the frequent attempts by the different
branches and their political inhabitants to claim success for themselves and
deflect negative political responsibility onto other institutions and branches of
government in an increasingly complex government of dispersed powers. All of
these developments make the fundamental Bickelian arguments in favor of the
exercise of the passive virtues of even greater relevance today, though they
complicate the analysis and require that it be updated for the modem separation
of powers context.
Raines offers one such opportunity. On the one hand, the reasons for delay
were even stronger than those originally envisioned by Bickel. In the context of
the item veto, delay allows the Court not only to learn about the mechanics of
the item veto in a specific case, but also after it has been exercised (or not
exercised) in a number of other contexts. How the modem Congress, Presidency, and federal bureaucracy will react to such legal interventions in a world
of constant interbranch jousting can best be understood from this perspective. In
addition, there is a normative benefit to delay; with time, the Court should be
better able to explore the reflective views of the elected branches of government
about the item veto in light of their own experience with it.
Nevertheless, while the Bickelian justifications for repose in Raines were
weighty, the challenges to the exercise of those virtues were-not coincidentally-also weighty. In a technique that has become increasingly common in
modern separation of powers confrontations, Congress mandated expedited
judicial review of the item veto before it had ever been exercised. Motivated in
part by a desire to deflect constitutional responsibility and perhaps cognizant of
the Court's tactical advantage in delay, Congress in effect expressed its direct
opposition to the exercise of the passive virtues.
Superficially, the Court's decision to elude direct confrontation by dismissing
on the grounds of congressional standing may appear to be the ultimate Bickelian maneuver. It avoided opposition to the passive virtues by exercising the

109. For a general discussion of Bickel's failure to take account of the modern administrative state,
see Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Countennajoritarian
Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 759,765-70 (1997).
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quintessential passive virtue-dismissing on procedural grounds. We believe,
however, that this modern confrontation over timing called for a non-Bickelian
response. In light of the seriousness of the challenge to judicial autonomy, and
the importance of delay in modern separation of powers confrontations, the
Court should have addressed the expedited judicial review provision directly.
By focusing on the congressional standing issue, the Court forfeited an opportunity to confront a device that seems to be increasingly prevalent in Congress,
yet nonetheless disturbing in the separation of powers context.
What of the congressional standing decision itself? We have not offered a
substantive evaluation of the Court's analysis, other than to speculate on why
the Court might have wanted to reach out and decide the issue and, having done
so, to confront the D.C. Circuit. Due to its structural role in protecting individual rights, the Court may have a very different view about being drawn into
separation of powers controversies. 110
That having been said, we doubt that the decision will stand as the final word
on congressional standing. While the majority opinion expressed serious doubts
about legislators suing in their official capacity for injuries to their official
responsibilities, it ultimately announces no blanket prohibition against such
actions. Indeed, there are a number of grounds upon which the decision can be
distinguished in future cases. For example, in justifying the result, the Court
specifically distinguished the plaintiffs' challenge in Raines from challenges by
individual members of Congress to rules changes that impact upon them in a
discriminatory manner. 111 If this language is taken seriously, constitutional
challenges to congressional voting procedures with differential impacts might
not be covered by the decision. The Court also distinguished Coleman v.
Miller, 112 the 1939 decision allowing state lawmakers to sue in their official
capacities, simply on the grounds that the plaintiffs' votes in Coleman were
"completely nullified." 113 Thus, the extent of the impact on future plaintiffs'
political influence might also be grounds for establishing legislative standing.
Finally, the Court's reliance on the failure of earlier legislators to bring suit in
"analogous confrontations" 114 might serve as limited precedent, in light of the
spate of lawmakers challenges both to executive branch initiatives and to the
internal workings of Congress.
There are also quite practical considerations to be factored in. The Court
knew, and the concurring opinion specifically announced, that this issue-the
constitutionality of the line-item veto--would return to the Court for ultimate
resolution. How the Court will respond in another case without that luxury
remains unclear. Given that the majority opinion only garnered five votes, there
is certainly considerable room for future judicial development and evolution.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

See supra Part II.
Raines, 117S. Ct. at2320n.7.
307 U.S. 433 (1939).
Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2319.
/d. at 2320.
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Viewed in this light, the decision seems quite consistent with recent
Rehnquist Court decisions that have tended to set forth general principles or
guidelines, rather than fixed rules, for constitutional adjudication. 115 Whatever
one's ultimate judgment about the Raines analysis of congressional standing,
the narrowness of the decision may have special value in the separation of
powers context. The ambiguities implicit in the law of standing have been a
constant source of academic criticism over the years, yet a valuable foundation
for judicial discretion in modulating the timing of judicial action. While Bickel
identified this general point many years ago, it is especially relevant to the
separation of powers context. The Court was wise to steer clear of the dispute.
Nonetheless, Raines remains unsettling. By failing to express concern with
the provision in the Act mandating accelerated judicial review, Raines, in effect,
winked at Congress and the White House's attempt to deflect political and
constitutional responsibility through structural interventions. This is unfortunate. Whether or not the Court ought to speak the last word on the Constitution's meaning, the elected branches ought to speak the first word about the
legality of their handiwork.

115. See Sullivan, supra note 22, at 24-27.
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